Apffelstaedt, A., & Freundt, J. (2024). Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 16(4), 440-474.
Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which participants distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less likely to voluntarily comply with a rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magnitude as removing the election altogether and imposing a rule exogenously. Our experiment shows how corrupting democratic processes impacts economic behavior and sheds light on factors that may underlie “rule legitimacy.” (JEL C90, D63, D72, D73, D83)
